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Intellectual property includes several areas of regulation 
which govern access to and uses of knowledge, information 
and technology. In addition to having many cultural and 
social benefits, knowledge, information and technology are 
key building blocks of an innovative economy. The central 
and perpetual challenge of intellectual property law and 
policy is to ensure that there are both adequate incentives for 
innovators and creators to generate these building blocks, 
and that those incentives do not overreach so as, in fact, to 
inhibit innovation. This description, however, no longer tells 
the whole intellectual property story. This article discusses 
the emergence through trade and investment agreements 
of a changed approach to 
the objectives of intellectual 
property protection, and the 
challenges that approach 
presents for knowledge-based 
and innovation development 
of New Zealand interests.
Intellectual property after the TRIPs 
Agreement 
After the giant leap forward that was 
the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement 
(World Trade Organization, 1994) there 
has been a relentless tide of demands 
for ever-increasing levels of intellectual 
property protection. The rhetoric that 
such increases are to support innovation 
is still maintained by some, but the United 
States has openly stated that it seeks 
increased intellectual property protection 
to further its export interests. In light of 
this, consider the following:
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“The [Productivity] Commission 
considers that Australia should 
not generally seek to include IP 
[intellectual property] provisions 
in further BRTAs [bilateral and 
regional trade agreements], and that 
any IP provisions that are proposed 
for a particular agreement should 
only be included after an economic 
assessment of the impacts, including 
on consumers, in Australia and 
partner countries. To safeguard 
against the prospect that acceptance 
of ‘negative sum game’ proposals 
[sic], the assessment would need 
to find that implementing the 
provisions would likely generate 
overall net benefits for members 
of the agreement. (Australian 
Productivity Commission, 2010, 
p.264)”
The requirement that there should 
be an overall benefit for there to be a 
case for increases in intellectual property 
protection applies to New Zealand, 
although such a firm statement as the 
above has not been publicly made here. The 
caution that the Australian Productivity 
Commission expressed arises because 
increased intellectual property protection 
is not necessarily desirable as it may be 
neither innovation- nor trade-enhancing. 
Intellectual property protection has 
moved from being primarily about 
incentives to innovate to becoming a tool 
that frequently over-protects. This move 
to over-protection (which is frequently 
boosted with the rhetoric of property) 
has been able to gain ground in part 
because it has been possible to increase 
protection within intellectual property’s 
existing framework. Demonstrating 
overall benefit through evidence before 
creating more intellectual property 
obligations should require differentiation 
between claims to support innovation. 
So, for example, if we accept the need 
for patents in order to encourage some 
types of innovation, then any increases 
in patent protection should be based on 
specific evidence of innovation-related 
problems, not the same bald claim that 
the increases are simply needed for 
innovation in a general sense. Identifying 
the ill-effects of over-protection, which is 
in essence protectionist-style intellectual 
property, should not be mistaken 
for saying that intellectual property 
protection is not important. On the 
contrary, the importance of incentive-
based intellectual property law is more 
crucial than ever.
“To restore a place for balance, 
international lawmakers and 
adjudicators must focus on the 
nature and purpose of that which is 
being protected. IP lawmakers need 
to be cognizant of other regimes and 
public-regarding concerns. In their 
analysis of issues and interpretation 
of agreements, decision makers 
should ensure they remain alert to IP 
values and refrain from contributing 
to the reconceptualization of the IP 
regime in ways that lead to longer-
term isolation of public regarding 
interests. As states consider their 
position in international negotiations, 
they too must recalibrate. Positions 
in the technology hierarchy change 
over time and every state must 
recognize that the flexibilities 
that it now wishes to limit may 
become indispensable to its society’s 
future well being. Even those 
in the strong position now may 
not have considered where this 
reconceptualization puts them in the 
future when they are not necessarily 
at the front of innovation or because 
they are not in control of the IP 
intensive part of an innovation-
related value chain. In either 
situation those pushing assetization 
now may wish for more flexibility 
in the future. (Dreyfuss and Frankel, 
2014,	p.46)”
It might be said that just as the nature 
of trade negotiations has evolved, the 
same is true of intellectual property. As 
Peter	Mumford	notes,	‘behind	the	border’	
regulation as part of trade discussions 
is not new to those working in diverse 
areas, including intellectual property 
(Mumford,	2014).	What	is	new,	however,	
is the way in which trade agreements 
are increasingly defining the details of 
intellectual property laws (which are and 
always have been behind the border), when 
these details were previously a matter 
largely of national discretion, provided 
certain internationally-agreed minimum 
standards were met. The framework 
of the main pre-TRIPS Agreement 
conventions (Berne and Paris) and the 
TRIPS Agreement is one of minimum 
standards of protection. These minimum 
standards often have flexibility because 
of undefined terms which national 
legislatures and courts shape, and there 
are broad permissions (rather than exact 
detail) for exceptions.1 The freedom to 
provide more extensive protection than 
the minimum standards require has not 
just resulted in increased protection, 
but has also resulted in increased detail 
about how to implement that protection, 
and agreements to eliminate existing 
flexibilities and exceptions.
At the forefront of the US trade-
negotiating objectives are increasing 
protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. That increases 
in intellectual property protection are 
sought is not new, but the intensity of the 
demands and their impacts on areas of 
policy outside of intellectual property’s 
core functions, such as health policy, has 
become striking. 
Existing free trade agreements 
(FTAs), such as the US–Korea FTA 
(KORUS), indicate the likely direction of 
At the forefront of the us trade-
negotiating objectives are increasing 
protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights.
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current negotiations in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP). There are numerous examples 
of ways in which intellectual property 
protection has increased. A small sample 
of examples includes: for copyright, 
increasing the term and reducing its 
flexibilities; for patents, allowing for 
term extension, requiring protection of 
incremental developments which might 
not otherwise be patentable (because 
they fail standards of novelty or inventive 
step), and increased data protection 
of information (such as clinical trial 
information) provided to regulatory 
agencies; and for trade marks, requiring 
protection of well-known marks even in 
instances where there is no consumer 
deception involved. As Rochelle Dreyfuss 
and I have noted, each change may look 
relatively small and be explainable (some 
perhaps more than others). Collectively, 
however, they are reconceptualising 
intellectual property protection away 
from a balanced regime designed to 
create and enhance innovation incentives 
to a mechanism which treats intellectual 
property both as a commodity in need 
of extensive protection and as an asset 
requiring investment protection. 
The development has entrenched 
a new qualitative vision of IP, 
one that drives a fundamental 
reconceptualization. Thus, a 
comparison of the WTO’s TRIPS 
Agreement with the original General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) moved from framing IP as a 
barrier to trade into conceptualizing 
it as a tradable commodity in the 
name of facilitating trade. It put 
enforcement on the international 
agenda and emphasized the rhetoric 
of ‘rights.’ The shift from TRIPS 
to FTAs and BITs was equally 
drastic: it converted IP into an 
investment asset subject to claims 
of direct and indirect expropriation, 
thereby emphasizing the rhetoric of 
‘property’. (Dreyfuss and Frankel, 
2014, p.3)
As we note, the effect of these changes 
cannot be underestimated. Intellectual 
property law based on incentive rationales 
also has scope for exceptions to meet 
competing concerns in areas such as 
education and health. But some trade and 
investment rationales are comparatively 
impervious to flexibility and balancing.
The shifting nature of intellectual property 
law and policy
If one looks at the role of intellectual 
property law from a domestic perspective, 
then the rationales are neither surprising 
nor indeed new. Using trade marks as an 
example, they are identifiers of goods and 
services in trade. They serve to distinguish 
one trader’s goods from those of another 
trader and the legal protection of registered 
trade marks is based on this distinguishing, 
or badge of origin, function. Economists 
provide nuance to this badge of origin 
role and suggest that trade marks also 
lower consumer search costs and foster 
quality (Landes and Posner, 2003). Perhaps 
the greatest challenge to this traditional 
trade mark role has been online. Courts 
first stretched the law of passing off and 
registered trade mark law to prevent 
‘cybersquatters’ on domain names (Frankel, 
2011, pp.825-42). The next online challenge 
is whether Google advertising words can 
amount to trade mark infringement.2 As 
isolated legal developments these look like 
natural progressions, but the expanding 
protection of trade marks is packaged 
into trade agreements. Through this 
mechanism, trade mark law is likely to 
expand to require protection of foreign 
marks that are well known, even when use 
of those well-known marks does not cause 
consumer confusion.3 What is well known 
in New Zealand does not necessarily result 
in correlative protection overseas. It is 
harder to be well known internationally 
when originating from New Zealand when 
well-known is defined on an international 
scale. 
This expansion matters because 
it moves trade mark law away from a 
badge of origin function, which has 
incentive values, to a property function 
which cannot easily be affected by 
other regimes. The central issue in an 
intellectual property-related investment 
dispute is not whether the incentive 
function of intellectual property is 
adversely affected, but whether the value 
of the intellectual property right has 
been impaired in some way. Of course, 
the exact details of each claim will vary 
depending on the investment agreement 
at issue and the subject matter involved. 
To be clear, investment agreements may 
have value; however, intellectual property 
as an investment is not a straightforward 
matter, as current disputes over trade 
marks (plain packaging)4 and patents 
(revocation of patents that have no 
utility)5 show.
The expanding nature of patent-
related protection is no longer confined 
to patent law itself; regulatory measures, 
which have as their primary goal the 
health and safety of medicines, are fast 
becoming vehicles to extend patent life. 
Trade agreements include requirements 
to extend data protection of clinical 
trial information that has been provided 
for the medicines approval system, and 
especially where there is or has been a 
patent involved. 
Intellectual property’s progressive 
reconceptualisation is resulting in 
conflict with areas of policy that it should 
support. Intellectual property protection 
should not be the enemy of innovation 
and creativity, or indeed health and 
environmental policy (to name a couple 
of overlapping areas). For New Zealand 
this means that, more than ever, we cannot 
act as if increases in intellectual property 
protection will not matter. Precisely the 
Intellectual property protection should not 
be the enemy of innovation and creativity, 
or indeed health and environmental policy 
(to name a couple of overlapping areas).
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opposite is true. The goods and services 
of the 21st century frequently depend 
on intellectual property (they may 
themselves even be intellectual property 
which is tradable in its own right). We 
need to ensure that there is adequate 
flexibility within the system to incentivise 
local innovation and to create business 
opportunities for using and developing 
intellectual property. Such incentives 
do not come purely from importing 
technology, which may well be costly to 
license, or developing predominantly 
domestic-based businesses. They may well 
come from New Zealand-based entities 
(including businesses and researchers) 
being part of global value chains.
There is an overused statement that, 
as net importers of intellectual property, 
we are in a different position from net 
exporters. That’s almost certainly so when 
it comes to products such as Hollywood 
movies and smart phones. Buyers always 
have different interests from sellers, but 
the position is now vastly more complex. 
Part of that complexity arises from the 
way in which intellectual property and 
global value chains are developing. If we 
use the definition of global value chain 
which includes research and development 
(R&D), manufacture and distribution, we 
can see that intellectual property can be 
involved at various points in that chain. 
Studies of global value chains will often 
show that the most valuable parts of the 
chain involve intellectual property (see, for 
example, NZPECC, 2013). New Zealand’s 
traditional goods and even some service 
industries are generally adept at being at 
parts of the value chain other than where 
intellectual property resides. However, we 
do see examples of businesses where this 
is not so, and these include businesses 
that both generate intellectual property 
and contribute to R&D. 
Globally, it has become a fallacy to treat 
R&D as always emanating from one entity 
based in one jurisdiction, with another 
entity (related or contracted) undertaking 
manufacturing and distribution. Global 
value chains are, of course, diverse in 
their	make-up	(Mumford,	2014),	but	they	
now include not only contributions of 
physical components or added services, 
but also contributions of intellectual 
property (including R&D) at different 
parts	 of	 the	 chain.	 Much	 intellectual	
property law, however, has evolved 
from a system which assumes a type of 
business model in which R&D is mostly 
based in one jurisdiction (manufacturing 
may have moved offshore). This model 
assumes that, apart from unauthorised 
or even unavoidable free-riding, R&D 
and distribution remain components of 
a value chain within the control of the 
key player (which may be licensed in 
some instances). There seem, however, 
to be few New Zealand businesses that 
operate in this way. While nothing in the 
law requires use of an explicit business 
model, certain assumptions about 
the relationship between intellectual 
property and innovation are based on 
that model. Consequently, we can ask 
whether aspects of intellectual property 
law are a bad fit for differing business 
models, such as those that are part of a 
global value chain but not in control of 
that chain. The answer is almost certainly 
yes, as New Zealand businesses make 
very little use of the New Zealand patent 
system.6 Some businesses make more 
use of overseas patent registration where 
their markets are. This would be one 
reason why we need a patent system, but 
it is questionable whether that system is 
appropriately tuned for local interests. Do 
we, for example, have enough exceptions 
in patent law?
The overlap of intellectual property and other 
regulatory issues
Because intellectual property involves 
matters such as pharmaceuticals, it has an 
impact on the cost of health care. Patented 
green technologies have an impact on the 
environment (Blakeney, 2013). Protection 
of copyright works may control access to 
information and cultural goods, which 
in turn shapes our culture. In short, 
intellectual property law affects social 
and economic policy. The parameters of 
intellectual property law are multifaceted, 
and its impacts not always immediate. 
So sometimes (as with all forecasts) it 
has been difficult to predict long-term 
effects of over-protection. The expansive 
creep of intellectual property protection 
into business methods – know-how, for 
example – has already had significant 
impacts on innovation, and will continue 
to do so.
At the beginning of this article I noted 
the call of the Australian Productivity 
Commission to look at the costs and 
benefits of intellectual property protection 
before adding to it. There are many who 
are trying to do exactly that in a variety 
of ways. The evidence-based policy 
industry has spawned an evidence-based 
intellectual property research industry.
In New Zealand we lack sufficient 
data to effectively answer all questions 
about the impacts of much regulation, 
including intellectual property law 
(Frankel and Yeabsley, 2014). We may not 
even have resources to gather all data, 
or indeed to answer all questions, but 
evidence about the effects of intellectual 
property law on New Zealand innovation 
is worth pursuing. We need better data 
to answer some of the detailed questions 
because bad intellectual property law 
can have considerable adverse economic 
effects. The relationship between New 
Zealand’s service industries and their 
uses of intellectual property is one key 
example.
Like other countries, we need to 
better monitor and review intellectual 
property law, especially where we have 
New Zealand experimentation (Colon-
Rios, 2014). An example is provided 
by the computer software exception in 
the Patents Act 2013. That ensures that 
computer software as such (which is really 
an algorithm) is not patentable.7 We will 
We need better data to answer some 
of the detailed questions because bad 
intellectual property law can have 
considerable adverse economic effects.
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need to review if and how this has helped 
New Zealand businesses. In copyright 
law, has our unique legislation around 
technological protection mechanisms 
benefited users of copyright works? 
conclusion
There are at least two key questions 
about New Zealand intellectual property 
law and our consequent approach to 
trade and investment agreements. What 
effect do increased standards have on 
businesses which generate intellectual 
property (including R&D) components 
in the value chain? And what effect 
does intellectual property law have on 
businesses where a commodity (e.g. 
milk, meat, dairy) is produced in New 
Zealand and the greatest value added to 
it is offshore and by others. The answers 
are likely to be very different, but trade 
agreements create an alliance between 
these concerns. In both instances, the 
tighter the policy space around intellectual 
property, the less likely New Zealanders 
will be able to increase and benefit from 
innovation opportunities.
1 These agreements provide for minimum standards of 
protection in intellectual property and require that those 
minimums are enacted in domestic law. Flexibilities exist 
where terms are not defined, such as patent laws, criteria 
of novelty and inventive step. Exceptions are a matter 
of national discretion within compliance with certain 
parameters known broadly as the three-step test. There are 
some variations between these tests in the different areas 
of intellectual property. There are relatively few exceptions 
outside of this test, such the permitted act of attributed 
quotation in copyright and exceptions for methods of medical 
treatment	in	patent.	Consequently,	the	ability	as	a	practical	
matter to limit the making exceptions is open as a matter of 
practice in trade agreements; whereas the rights cannot be 
so limited they can only be expanded. 
2 In Intercity Group (NZ) Ltd v Nakedbus NZ Ltd [2014]	NZHC	
124, the particular ad words at issue were found not to 
amount to trade mark infringement. In other situations, use 
of Google ad words may amount to trade mark infringement: 
see	Interflora	v	Marks	and	Spencer	[2013]	EWHC	1291.
3 Protection of well-known marks is already required under the 
Paris	Convention,	which	is	incorporated	into	and	expanded	
in the TRIPS Agreement, article 16. The protection of 
well-known trade marks from so-called diluting effects is 
an ever-expanding area of trade mark law. See WIPO and 
Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial 
Property,	Joint	Recommendation	Concerning	Provisions	on	
the	Protection	of	Well-Known	Marks,	available	at	http://www.
wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/marks/833/
pub833.pdf, which some trade agreements are now requiring 
compliance with.
4 Australia is subject to an investment dispute claim brought 
by tobacco company Philip Morris Asia under the 1993 
investment	treaty	between	Australia	and	Hong	Kong:	see	
the claim and response, available at http://www.ag.gov.au/
tobaccoplainpackaging.
5	 Eli	Lilly	is	presently	suing	the	government	of	Canada	for	
the revocation of two patents under the investment chapter 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
The revocations in question have been considered by nine 
different	judges	in	the	Canadian	system.	See	Eli	Lilly	and	
Company	v	Canada	(ICSID	case	no.	UNCT/14/2)	claim	and	
response,	available	at	https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID.
6 The answer is likely different for trade marks, and different 
again for copyright.
7 Patents Act 2013, section 11.
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